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Abstract
Spontaneous collapse theories of quantum mechanics turn the usual Schrödinger 
equation into a stochastic dynamical law. In particular, in this paper I will focus 
on the GRW theory. Two philosophical issues that can be raised about GRW con-
cern (a) the ontology of the theory, in particular the nature of the wave function and 
its role within the theory, and (b) the interpretation of the objective probabilities 
involved in the dynamics of the theory. During the last years, it has been claimed 
that we can take advantage of dispositional properties in order to develop an ontol-
ogy for GRW theory, and also in order to ground the objective probabilities which 
are postulated by it. However, in this paper I will argue that the dispositional inter-
pretations which have been discussed in the literature so far are either flawed or—
at best—incomplete. If we want to endorse a dispositional interpretation of GRW 
theory we thus need an extended account which specifies the precise nature of those 
properties and which makes also clear how they can correctly ground all the prob-
abilities postulated by the theory. Thus, after having introduced several different 
kinds of probabilistic dispositions, I will try to fill the gap in the literature by pro-
posing a novel and complete dispositional account of GRW, based on what I call 
spontaneous weighted multi-track propensities. I claim that such an account can sat-
isfy both of our desiderata.
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1 Introduction
The Ghirardi–Rimini–Weber (GRW) theory1 is a spontaneous collapse theory of 
quantum mechanics which modifies the Schrödinger equation—i.e. the law which 
guides the temporal evolution of the wave function—to transform it into a (non-lin-
ear) stochastic dynamical law.
Several philosophical issues can be raised about collapse theories in quantum 
mechanics, and GRW theory has been the focus of the debate for the last two dec-
ades. Among them, two crucial questions concern (a) the ontology of GRW, in par-
ticular the nature of the wave function and its role within the theory, and (b) the 
interpretation of the probabilities involved in the theory. In this paper I will focus 
on the dispositional account of GRW. More precisely, it has been claimed—most 
notably by Dorato and Esfeld [15], Egg and Esfeld [16], Esfeld and Gisin [18] and 
Esfeld et al. [19]2—that we can take advantage of dispositional properties in order to 
develop an ontology for GRW and also in order to ground the objective probabilities 
which are postulated by the theory. In addition, some authors—mainly Frigg and 
Hoefer [22] and Suárez [34]—have focused on providing an account of the proba-
bilities in GRW as propensities—i.e. probabilistic dispositions. It should be stressed 
that, according to Frigg and Hoefer [22], the propensity theory of probability and 
the Humean account of chances are the only two viable interpretative option for the 
probabilities in GRW.3 Therefore, the propensity-dispositional account is particu-
larly relevant in the context of GRW.
My aims in the present paper are the following. First of all, I will discuss the 
dispositional interpretations of GRW which are present in the literature. As I have 
remarked, one of their aims is to account for the objective probabilities implied by 
GRW in terms of probabilistic dispositions (or propensities). However, I will point 
out a crucial gap which is present in the account defended by Esfeld and his co-
authors. In a nutshell, they merely define the dispositions in GRW as ‘dispositions 
to localize spontaneously’. But the dispositions in GRW should be far more com-
plex than that, as we will see from the technical presentation of the theory I will 
provide in the next section. If we want to endorse a dispositional interpretation of 
this theory—and of collapse theories in general—we thus need a complete account 
which specifies the full nature of those properties and which makes clear how they 
can ground the probabilities postulated by the theory. Frigg and Hoefer [22]—even 
though they do not focus on the metaphysics of the wave function in GRW—discuss 
all the possible interpretations of the probabilities in GRW, and give a few more 
details concerning the kinds of propensities that would be entailed by the theory. 
However, I will argue that their proposal is flawed and—in a way—incomplete. First 
of all, just like Esfeld and the others, they do not propose a detailed description of 
2 Even though it should be pointed out that Esfeld does not endorse dispositionalism anymore (see 
Esfeld and Deckert [17]).
3 See Childers [9] and Hájek [28] for an introduction to the propensity theory and to the Humean 
account of probabilities.
1 The theory has been firstly presented by Ghirardi et  al. [27]. In this paper I will focus on the non-
relativistic version of the theory.
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the propensities entailed by the theory, but they present them rather informally.4 
Secondly, they claim that the dynamics of GRW concerns two distinct coupled dis-
positions: I will suggest that this model seems to be at odds with the dynamics of 
the theory. Thirdly, and most importantly, their propensity model does not secure 
the mutual exclusivity of the different possible outcomes of the stochastic process—
something which is forced by the formalism of GRW. I shall show that also the 
account sketched by Suárez [34] faces the same objection. I believe that one crucial 
reason for which the latter important issue has been overlooked is that a rigorous 
treatment of the ontology of propensities in GRW is still missing in the literature. 
In fact—before putting forward these objections—I will introduce several different 
kinds of propensities, and I shall provide a detailed account of them by providing a 
formal characterization of each of them. Then, I will use that formal framework to 
formulate the objections mentioned above.
Therefore, taking stock of these objections, and having stressed the shortcom-
ings of the existent dispositional approaches concerning GRW, I will propose a new 
dispositional account which can satisfy all of our desiderata. More precisely, I will 
single out a specific kind of probabilistic disposition among those that I have intro-
duced, which is able to ground both the probabilities postulated by GRW through a 
single disposition: I call them spontaneous weighted multi-track propensities. Their 
form also secure that exactly one outcome is produced, and thus that the mutual 
exclusivity problem can be avoided. This novel account is meant to be a refined and 
extended version of the one proposed by Esfeld and his co-authors: it provides a 
more precise and explicit dispositional interpretation of the wave function within 
collapse theories and also a revised propensity interpretation of their probabilities. 
In this way I fill a crucial gap in the literature, since—as I have noticed—propensi-
ties are usually described in the context of GRW merely in informal terms. More-
over, another original feature of this paper will be to bring together the literature 
about the dispositional interpretation of the wave function in GRW and the one con-
cerning the objective probabilities in GRW. As I have suggested, the former topic 
should not remain disconnected from the latter.
2  A Brief Presentation of GRW Theory
I shall now provide a very brief presentation of the basic principles of the GRW 
theory which we shall need for the continuation of the paper. I rely on the classic 
formulation given by Bassi and Ghirardi [5], pp. 41–42)—which provides a com-
plete and technical presentation of the theory.5
Let us first define the usual Schrödinger equation:
4 Even though it should be admitted that the focus of their paper are not propensities, but the Humean 
account of the probabilities in GRW.
5 See also Bassi and Ghirardi [4].
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where H is the usual non-relativistic Schrödinger Hamiltonian. Then, Bassi and Ghi-
rardi spell out the core of GRW via the following five points:
1. Each particle of a system of n distinguishable particles experiences, with a mean 
rate i , a sudden spontaneous localization process.
2. In the time interval between two successive spontaneous processes the system 
evolves according to the usual Schrödinger equation
3. The sudden spontaneous process is a localization described by:
where �� ix
�
= Li
x
�⟩.Li
x
 is a norm-reducing, positive, self-adjoint, linear opera-
tor in the n-particle Hilbert space H, representing the localization of particle i 
around the point x
4. The probability density for the occurrence of a localization at point x is assumed 
to be:
This requires that:
5. The localization operators Li
x
 have been chosen to have the form: 
qi being the position operator for particle i ([5], pp. 41–42)
The value of the parameters  (for a single particle) and  are carefully chosen as 
follows:
The parameter 1∕
√
 is a distance and it measures the distance between the two 
peaks of localization of the two superposed elements, when the collapse happens 
and the superposition is eliminated. On the other hand, the value of  entails that 
a single particle system is localized once every 108–109 years. This means that a 
single proton can remain in a superposed state for a very long time. By contrast, 
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macroscopic systems behave in a different way. The relation between the frequencies 
of the macro-systems and the ones of the micro-systems is expressed by the follow-
ing equation:
The theory assumes that all the values k are equal (i.e. they all correspond to 
 ≅ 10−16s−1 ). Thus, considering a system composed by n microscopic constituents, 
we have that macro = n . Consider a macroscopic system made up of 1023 micro-
scopic particles. Then, macro ≅ 107s−1. This explains why we do not have super-
posed states as results of measurement processes.6
The occurrence of hits in GRW is a Poisson process, i.e. a process which repre-
sent the number of occurrences of a type of event which take place during an inter-
val of time  . The probabilities which characterize Poisson distributions are repre-
sented as follows:
where p(n = m) is the probability that the number of events n occurring during the 
time interval  takes value m = 0, 1, 2,… and  is the parameter of the distribution.7 
 can be considered as the average number of events per unit time. Thus, we can 
say that “the probability of an event occuring during the infinitesimal interval dt 
is dt ” [22], p. 373. As we have seen, GRW sets the value of  to be  ≅ 10−16s−1 . 
Two peculiar features of Poisson processes are that the rate  is constant over time 
and that each event is stochastically independent to the other events in the Poisson 
process.
We can now complete the presentation of GRW theory by introducing the central 
stochastic equation which substitutes the Schrödinger equation—keeping in mind 
that, within GRW, the reduction mechanism transforms pure states into statistical 
mixtures. Following Bassi and Ghirardi ([5], p. 43) we can indeed express the hit-
ting process for a single particle, whose wave function �⟩ is transformed into ��x⟩ , 
as follows:
Bassi and Ghirardi then show how to derive the evolution equation for (t) during 
a time interval dt . As we have seen, the localization process is Poissonian and speci-
fies a probability dt for the occurrence of a hit during the interval dt—in which  is 
transformed to T[]—and, conversely, a probability 1 − dt for the non-occurrence 
of hits. The evolution equation for (t) can thus be stated as follows:
macro =
n∑
k=1
k
p(n = m) =
e−()m
m!
,
�⟩⟨� = � d3xP(x)
�⟩⟨�
����x⟩��
2
= � d3xLix�⟩⟨�Lix ≡ T
�
�⟩⟨�
�
6 See Ghirardi ([25], Ch. 16) for a detailed introduction of this process.
7 Cf. Frigg ([21], p. 267).
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8
This presentation gives us a minimal overview of the central core of GRW theory. 
However, this is everything which we will need in order to discuss the main topics 
of the present paper. Before moving on, however, I want to make a couple of points. 
The first issue I want to raise is the role of probabilities within the theory. In GRW, 
we have described two probabilistic aspects: (a) the ‘sudden spontaneous localiza-
tion process’ happens with a given frequency, and thus the system has only a small 
probability per unit time of undergoing a hit, and (b) the localization point is chosen 
randomly or, better, is determined by a specific probability density in accordance to 
the predictions of Born’s rule. Moreover, it should be pointed out that those proba-
bilities must be objective. In other words, any subjective reading of the probabilities 
in collapse theories is ruled out.9 This is made clear especially by the fact that all 
collapse theories are realist approaches to quantum theory which do not depend on 
the existence of observers who perform the measurements. In the words of Ghirardi 
([25], p. 409): “no observer carries out any measurement: nature itself (Einstein’s 
God?) chooses to induce such a process according to random choices but with pre-
cise probabilities”.
However, before we delve further into this topic, we should first provide a clearer 
picture concerning the ontology of the theory. Viz., we should explain what there 
is in the world, according to collapse theories. Until now, we have only discussed 
about the wave function, and we have considered it as the complete description of 
any quantum system. However, it is nowadays widely believed10 that the wave func-
tion is not everything there is according to collapse theories: we should specify also 
a—equally fundamental—primitive ontology.
3  Primitive Ontologies for the GRW Theory
Several physicists and philosophers of science share the opinion that the formal 
rules presented so far, which are the ones used to make predictions, are not all there 
is to say about GRW. According to Bell,11 and according to Bassi and Ghirardi,12 
we should specify also a fundamental primitive ontology for collapse theories—
besides the purely formal aspects of the theories—to give an account of the fun-
damental constituents of reality. This issue has been presented in the clearest way 
(t + dt) = (1 − dt)
[
(t) −
i
ℏ
[H, (t)]dt
]
+ dtT[(t)]
i.e.
d
dt
(t) = −
i
ℏ
[H, (t)] − ((t) − T[(t)]).
10 See Clifton and Monton [12] and Albert [1, 2] for a different opinion.
11 See Bell [6].
12 See Bassi and Ghirardi [4].
8 Cf. Bassi and Ghirardi ([5], p. 43).
9 See also Frigg and Hoefer ([22], p. 376) on this point.
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in a landmark paper by Allori et  al. [3], where the authors present the two main 
alternative ontologies for collapse theories (focusing on GRW): the flash ontology 
(GRWf) and the mass density ontology (GRWm).13 In this section I will present 
these two alternatives, focusing on the relation between these ontologies and the 
wave function.
GRWm was originally proposed by Ghirardi et al. [26]. Within GRWm, the prim-
itive ontology is constituted by a matter-density field of variables m(x, t) ranging 
over points in three-dimensional space at times t , defined as follows ([3], p. 359):
Essentially, according to GRWm, what exists at the fundamental level is just a 
distribution of mass in three-dimensional space whose behaviour is determined by 
the wave function in accordance with the stochastic dynamics which has been pre-
sented in the last section.
On the other hand, GRWf provides a completely different ontology. One of the 
first formulations of this ontology has been advanced by Bell [6]. In the words of 
Allori et al., according to this account “the primitive ontology is given by ‘events’ 
in space–time called flashes, mathematically described by [discrete] points in 
space–time” ([3], p. 360). Similarly to GRWm, in GRWf the spatiotemporal loca-
tions of these flashes is determined by the history of the wave function: “Every 
flash corresponds to one of the spontaneous collapses of the wave function, and its 
space–time location is just the space–time location of that collapse” (Ibidem).
After having presented the two alternative accounts for the primitive ontology of 
GRW, we should notice the following. Within both accounts, the primitive ontol-
ogy is not the only thing which matters: on the contrary, the wave function plays a 
crucial role. This is strongly stressed by Allori et al. [3]. They are in fact very clear 
in pointing out that, within this picture, the wave function tells matter how to move, 
viz. it governs the primitive ontology. That is, the wave function has a remarkable 
nomological character—at least prima facie.
The presentation of GRW we have brought out so far has shown very clearly two 
distinct aspects which deserve careful philosophical investigation. First, we should 
provide an interpretation of the intrinsic probabilities of the theory. To do so, we 
should explain what grounds them. Second, given the important role which is played 
by the wave function, we should provide an account of its nature.
In recent years, the literature concerning GRW—and, in general, primitive ontol-
ogy in quantum mechanics—has focused mainly on the latter issue.14 On the other 
hand, some other authors—most notably Suárez [34] and Frigg and Hoefer [22]—
have focused on the former issue. In contrast, my aim for the rest of this paper will 
be different: I will discuss a metaphysical account that can provide a unified meta-
physical picture which gives answers to the main questions arising in each of the 
m(x, t) =
N∑
i=1
mi ∫
ℝ3N
dq1 … dqn
(
qi − x
)|||
(
q1,… , qN , t
)|||
2
.
13 Or, alternatively, ‘matter’ density.
14 See for example Belot [7], Esfeld et al. [19] or Chen [10] for an overview.
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areas. In particular, I will focus on the dispositional account of GRW developed by 
Dorato and Esfeld [15] and Egg and Esfeld [16]. As I will argue, that account is not 
satisfactory as it stands and should be amended.
4  Dorato and Esfeld on GRW as an Ontology of Dispositions
Dorato and Esfeld [15] argue that a plausible way to interpret the spontaneous 
localizations that are implied by spontaneous collapse theories is by claiming that 
according to GRW “non-massless micro-systems possess a disposition for sponta-
neous localization” ([15], p. 43). This view has been discussed and defended also 
by Suárez [34], Dorato [14], Egg and Esfeld [16], Esfeld and Gisin [18] and Esfeld 
et al. [19].
This kind of disposition differs from the standard definition of dispositional prop-
erty in two important ways. Let’s look at the classical conditional analysis of (deter-
ministic) dispositions15:
F is a disposition [or dispositional property] iff there are an associated stimu-
lus condition and manifestation such that, necessarily, x has F only if x would 
produce the manifestation M if it were in the stimulus condition S (Choi and 
Fara [11]).
The dispositions within GRW, on the other hand, do not need to be in any particular 
stimulus condition to be activated; instead, they manifest themselves spontaneously, 
in the sense that their manifestations are independent of any interaction. Moreover, 
those dispositions can be regarded as propensities. In fact, probability values are 
attached to their manifestations. In other words, it is not true that once those dis-
positions are triggered, a single unique manifestation M is produced with certainty. 
There are different ways to spell out the notion of propensity, and I will say more 
about these concepts in Sect. 5.
Let us consider now more carefully what is the precise role of those disposi-
tions within the ontology of GRW, for Dorato and Esfeld. First of all, according to 
them the fundamental ontology is constitued by the entities composing the primitive 
ontology of the theory, i.e. either by “flashes” (in GRWf) or by the density of “stuff” 
(in GRWm). Then, consider a superposed state like the following:
According to them, “the disposition for spontaneous localization […] is the 
essence of such spatially superposed states, since the latter, according to GRW, are 
to be regarded as intrinsically unstable” (Dorato and Esfeld [15], p. 44). For a physi-
cal system to be in a superposed state like �⟩ means to have a certain probability to 
localize spontaneously either in region A or in region B—according to GRW. Thus, 
�⟩ = 1√
2
�A⟩ + 1√
2
�B⟩.
15 See also Bird [8] for a classical account of dispositions.
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according to Dorato and Esfeld, if a physical system is in such state, then it pos-
sesses a disposition to localize: “the wave function is a mathematical symbol essen-
tially referring to such propensities” (Ibid.).
Summing up their position, Dorato and Esfeld claim that both the primitive ontol-
ogy and the wave function—qua disposition—are fundamental. In particular, fol-
lowing Allori et al. [3], they believe that “the role of the wave function is to provide 
an algorithm that guides the evolution of the physical system” (Ibidem, p. 47). On 
the one hand, in the case of GRWf the flashes are the manifestations of those dispo-
sitions to localize.16 On the other hand, concerning GRWm, the dispositions govern 
the evolution of the mass density field. The latter view is shared also by Egg and 
Esfeld [16].
We should now notice that the dispositional view defended by Dorato and Esfeld 
[15], Egg and Esfeld [16] is meant to give also an account of objective probabili-
ties in GRW in term of propensities.17 They claim that by attributing intrinsic dis-
positions to the physical systems governed by GRW we are able to attribute single-
case probabilities, in the sense that we are able to say that single systems possess an 
objective probability to localize. Those probabilities do not derive from the frequen-
cies that we register: on the contrary, the frequencies are the manifestation of the 
propensities to localize. In other words, according to the dispositional account, the 
objective probabilities in GRW are grounded on the nature of those dispositional 
properties which characterize superposed states.
The problem with their account is that they merely say that, according to GRW, 
physical systems are characterized by “dispositions to localize spontaneously”. I 
take this to be simply a rough proposal for an account of GRW in terms of disposi-
tions, and not a fully-fledged account, of course. If our aim is also to ground the 
objective probabilities of GRW on propensities, then we need to specify more pre-
cisely what the metaphysical structure of those properties is and how they are able 
to produce the exact probabilities of the theory.18 This will be the main topic of the 
rest of the paper.
16 See also Esfeld and Gisin ([18], p. 252) for a brief discussion of GRWf as an ontology of dispositions 
exactly alike the one defended by Dorato and Esfeld [15].
17 Arguably, it is easy to show that, when considered in the specific context of collapse theories in quan-
tum mechanics, the propensity theory of probability does not face the usual challenges that are raised 
against it (e.g. the reference class problem). See Frigg and Hoefer ([22], p. 384–5) for a defence of this 
claim.
18 Placek [32] develops a detailed causal model for the probabilities assigned to the localizations of 
flashes within GRWf (and the relativistic version of GRWf). However—unlike the account I am going to 
present – his proposal is limited to GRWf and in particular to the probabilities linked to the flashes dis-
tribution. In other words, he considers only one of the two probabilistic terms of GRW. But most impor-
tantly, his account is based on causal probabilistic spaces and branching-time models, and not on a meta-
physics of dispositional properties—at least in the sense in which dispositions have been discussed in the 
literature (i.e. as properties identified via counterfactual conditionals). On the contrary, my current aim 
is to craft a dispositional account of GRW which accommodates GRW probabilities within the standard 
notion of dispositional property.
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5  A Detailed Topology of Propensities
Some attempts have been made to account for the objective probabilities in GRW 
in terms of dispositions, quite independently from the issue concerning the physi-
cal meaning of the wave function within the theory. However, these accounts are 
barely sketches of theories, and moreover I shall argue that they all faces prob-
lematic consequences. Thus, a complete and adequate account is needed. In this 
section I will firstly propose a novel detailed account of propensities in general, 
which can account for different kinds of propensities. Secondly, I shall introduce 
the proposals given by Frigg and Hoefer [22] and Suárez [34] for a propensity 
theory of GRW. Then, relying on the propensity account that I am going to pro-
pose, I will argue that—once they are carefully formulated—both their proposals 
are problematic. Finally, I shall put forward a novel propensity theory of GRW 
which can overcome the problems faced by the other theories.
The propensity account of probabilities traces back to Popper [33], but many 
different versions of this theory have been defended throughout the years (see for 
example Fetzer [20], Miller [31], Gillies [24] and Mellor [29, 30]). In the follow-
ing, I will try to spell out a specific version of the propensity theory, tailored to 
account for the probabilities in GRW.
Summing up what I have pointed out so far about propensities, we can say that—
according to the propensity account—probability statements are made true by irre-
ducibly dispositional properties possessed by objects. This means that probability is 
an objective feature of the world. As I have claimed in Sect. 2, the probabilities in 
GRW are required to be objective, and thus the propensity theory can easily acco-
modate this desideratum. Moreover, as we have noticed, the propensities in GRW 
are single-case in the following sense: “A single-case propensity theory is one in 
which propensities are regarded as propensities to produce a particular result on a 
specific occasion” (Gillies [24], p. 822). That is, the propensities in question are not 
linked to ensembles or to the repetition of trials. On the contrary, they are disposi-
tional properties possessed by single physical systems which ground probabilities of 
a single particular outcome, tied to the single object which instantiates them.
First of all, I will now introduce a distinction within the category of propensi-
ties. We can indeed distinguish between what I call single-track and multi-track 
propensities. I define single-track propensities as follows, adopting Suárez’s 
([34], p. 430) definition of propensities, slighlty reformulated:
Single-track propensity: If object O possesses single-track propensity P 
with manifestation M then: were O to be in the appropriate circumstance C, 
it would M with probability p(0 ≤ p ≤ 1).
They are called single-track propensities because they are defined by a single 
(counterfactual) conditional which links the triggering condition C with a unique 
manifestation event M. However, we can easily modify this definition to account 
also for spontanously triggered dispositions:
Spontaneous single-track propensity: If object O possesses spontaneous 
single-track propensity PS with manifestation M then: were O to instanti-
1 3
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ate PS during an infinitesimal interval of time dt , during dt it would M with 
probability dt(0 ≤ dt ≤ 1).
In other words, the ‘triggering condition’ of a spontanous single-track propensity 
is simply its existence. They are defined by an unique manifestation M, and for a 
given interval of time the bearer of that kind of propensity can either manifest M 
or not manifest M.
In addition to single-track propensities, I introduce the notion of multi-track 
propensities19:
Multi-track propensities: If object O possesses probabilistic disposition D 
with set of mutually exclusive manifestations 
{
M1,… ,Mn|n ≥ 2} , then: were 
O in the condition Σ , it would produce exactly one manifestation Mi from the 
set of manifestations 
{
M1,… ,Mn|n ≥ 2}.
Notice that they are called ‘multi-track’ because the same stimulus condition can 
lead to different manifestations. Moreover, when they are triggered, at least one man-
ifestation is produced,20 even though it is randomly selected. It should be stressed, 
however, that this kind of propensities presents a possible drawback. In fact, from 
the defintion above it follows that multi-track propensities generate their manifesta-
tion totally randomly. But there may be contexts—like in GRW, as we will see—
where the manifestation is picked randomly from the set of possible manifestations 
but, at the same time, accordingly to a probability distribution. That is, we want to 
be able to assign different probabilities to the distinct outcomes of propensities.
To solve this problem, firstly we can define a probability mass function which 
assign different probabilities to the members of the set 
{
M1,… ,Mn|n ≥ 2} as 
follows21.
The probability mass function p of a discrete random variable X is the function 
p ∶ ℝ → [0, 1] , defined by
If X is a discrete random variable that takes on the values M1,M2,… , then
The idea is thus to embed this probability function into the definition of multi-
track propensity. Let us label this revised version of multi-track propensities as 
weighted multi-track propensities:
Weighted multi-track propensity: If object O possesses weighted multi-
track propensity DW, with set of mutually exclusive manifestations 
p(M) = P(X = M) for M1,… ,Mn.
p
(
Mi
)
> 0, p
(
M1
)
+ p
(
M2
)
+⋯ = 1, and p(M) = 0 for all otherM.
19 Cf. Gebharter and Fischer ([23], p. 3).
20 Notice here that single-track propensities can actually be considered as very special cases of multi-
track propensities, where the set of (mutually exclusive) possible manifestations is composed by {M or 
not-M}. However, for simplicity, we will stick to the formulation stated above.
21 Cf. Dekking et al. ([13], p. 43).
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{
M1,… ,Mn|n ≥ 2} , where a specific value p(Mi) given by the probabil-
ity mass density p , with 0 ≤ p(Mi) ≤ 1 , is assigned to each member Mi of 
that set and p
(
M1
)
+⋯ + p
(
Mn
)
= 1 , then: were O in the condition Σ , it 
would produce exactly one manifestation Mi from the set of manifestations {
M1,… ,Mn|n ≥ 2} , where the probability of producing Mi is given by p(Mi).
Moreover, just as for single-track propensities, multi-track propensities too can be 
spontanouesly triggered. We just have to specify a spontaneous triggering probabil-
ity dt over the appropriate infinitesimal interval of time dt , which fixes the prob-
ability for the spontaneous activation of the disposition during that interval. We can 
thus define the notion of spontaneous weighted multi-track propensity:
Spontaneous weighted multi-track propensity: If object O possesses spon-
tanous weighted multi-track propensity DSW during an infinitesimal interval 
of time dt , with set of mutually exclusive manifestations 
{
M1,… ,Mn|n ≥ 2} , 
where a specific value p
(
Mi
)
 given by the probability mass density 
p , with 0 ≤ p(Mi) ≤ 1 , is assigned to each member Mi of that set and 
p
(
M1
)
+⋯ + p
(
Mn
)
= 1 , then: were O to possess DSW during dt , during dt 
it would produce exactly one manifestation Mi from the set of manifestations {
M1,… ,Mn|n ≥ 2}—where the probability of producing Mi is given by p(Mi)
—with probability dt.
To recap, we have now defined two distinct notions of propensities: the former spec-
ify a kind of disposition which has merely a certain degree of probability to produce 
its unique manifestation; the latter, on the contrary, produce with probability p = 1 a 
manifestation, but that manifestation is chosen randomly—in accordance with a pre-
cise probability distribution—from a set of possible manifestations. In addition, both 
these kinds of propensities can produce their manifestations either given a certain 
stimulus condition or spontaneously. They both implement probabilities within their 
definitions, but they do that in slighly different ways: while single-track propensities 
can accommodate at most one probabilistic term, multi-track propensities—due to 
their manifestation selection step—can ground up to two probabilistic processes. I 
will argue that spontaneous weighted multi-track propensities are what we need to 
account for the probabilities in GRW.
As I made clear in Sect.  2, there are two fundamental objective probabilities 
within GRW: the probability associated to the Poissonian hitting process, linked 
with the frequency value  ≅ 10−16s−1 , and the probability density Pi(x) =
‖‖‖
|| ix
⟩‖‖‖
2
 
assigned to the localization process. Thus, we should account for both probabilistic 
processes.22
22 The belief that GRW incorporates two distinct fundamental probabilities, and that we should provide 
a philosophical account for both, is shared also by Timpson ([35], p. 208) and by Frigg and Hoefer ([22], 
p. 384).
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6  Propensities in GRW 
Now, before I advance my proposal for a dispositional account of GRW, I will ana-
lyse Frigg and Hoefer’s and Suárez’s proposals in the light of the different types of 
propensities that I have introduced so far, in order to show which problems emerge 
from their accounts once we spell it out in a clearer form.
Starting with Frigg and Hoefer [22], they have proposed a reading of GRW prob-
abilities in terms of propensities, which is slightly more detailed than Dorato and 
Esfeld’s one. They argue that, according to this interpretation of GRW, physical sys-
tems possess two kinds of single-case propensities, which ground the corresponding 
random processes and their respective probabilities. They also highlight the fact that 
those two processes are coupled, because one provides the trigger for the other. On 
the one hand, they claim that the occurrence of hits is grounded by spontaneous 
propensities:
The occurrence of a localization […] does not seem to [have] a triggering con-
dition […] There is a chance of dt for each elementary constituent to decay 
during dt […]. Hence [this random process] can be understood on the basis of 
the single case propensity view. (Frigg and Hoefer [22], p. 384).
On the other hand, regarding the localization processes, they claim that:
It seems natural to say that for every possible localization event Hx the wave 
function has a (single case) propensity to undergo this particular localization. 
(Ibid.).
However, they do not give further details about the structure of their propensity 
reading of GRW. In addition, I am going to show that—once we formalize this pro-
posal—some issues emerge.
First of all, as we have seen, they claim that the dynamics of GRW embeds 
two coupled random processes, and that a propensity theory of probability should 
ground the probabilities assigned to those processes onto two kinds of propensities. 
Indeed, they seem to distinguish between those propensities which ground the hit-
ting processes and those that underlie the localization processes.
Considering the first of the two quotes above, it seems that they want to charac-
terize the objective chances embedded within the random hitting processes as spon-
taneous single-track propensities. Remember that I have defined these as follows: 
“If object O possesses spontaneous single-track propensity PS with manifestation M 
then: were O to instantiate PS during an infinitesimal interval of time dt , during dt 
it would M with probability dt(0 ≤ dt ≤ 1).”. Thus, we can say that hitting pro-
cesses are caused by the (spontaneous) triggering of spontaneous single-track pro-
pensities possessed by physical systems, whose manifestation M is the occurrence 
of the hit and whose probability dt is determined by the value of the parameter 
 postulated by GRW. Those propensities determine thus the Poisson distributions 
defined by the theory.
Passing now to the second kind of random processes within GRW—i.e. the local-
ization processes—let us consider as our case study the simple superposed state �⟩ 
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of Sect. 3. According to Frigg and Hoefer, the occurrence of the first random pro-
cess—the hit—triggers the localization process �⟩
loc.
⟶
� i
x
⟩
‖� i
x
⟩‖ . Thus, the quantum 
state �⟩ localizes either in region A or in region B, with a probability given by 
Pi(x) =
‖‖‖
|| ix
⟩‖‖‖
2
 , where x is where the localization takes place. Concerning the 
quantum system in our example, the same probability Pi(x) = 0.5 is assigned to both 
the locations.
As I have already remarked, they claim that the most natural way to conceive 
this process is “to say that for every possible localization event Hx the wave func-
tion has a (single case) propensity to undergo this particular localization”. This 
seems to suggest to model those propensities as simple single-track propensi-
ties (“If object O possesses single-track propensity P with manifestation M then: 
were O to be in the appropriate circumstance C, it would M with probability 
p(0 ≤ p ≤ 1).”). More precisely, each system possesses a set of individual and 
distinct single-track propensities, one for every localization event Hx : the appro-
priate circumstances are constituted by the occurrence of the hits, the localiza-
tion events are the manifestations of those propensities—i.e. they are caused by 
them—and their probabilities are fixed by the probability function Pi(x).
To recap, the propensity account of the random processes in GRW proposed by 
Frigg and Hoefer can be stated as follows: spontaneous single-track propensities 
produce hits which, in turn, trigger single-track propensities whose manifesta-
tions are the localizations of the wave function.
In the following, I shall point out why I find this account unsatisfactory. First 
of all, I shall move what I consider to be a decisive objection against this specific 
propensity view. That is, I will claim that the model sketched by Frigg and Hoefer 
fails to secure the mutual exclusivity of the different possible localization events. 
Secondly, I will add some considerations concerning the fact that this account—as I 
have formalized it—embeds two distinct and coupled probabilistic dispositions.
Starting from the first point, we can raise the following objection against Frigg 
and Hoefer’s account of dispositions to localize. Consider the quantum state �⟩ 
mentioned above. According to their account, the quantum system S described by 
�⟩ possesses two distinct propensities P1 and P2:
(1) S possesses the single-track propensity P1 such that: were there an occurrence 
of a hit, S would localize in the region A with probability p = 0.5
(2) S possesses the single-track propensity P2 such that: were there an occurrence 
of a hit, S would localize in the region B with probability p = 0.5
Recall that localization events are produced by dispositions to localize. Now, 
suppose that system S undergoes a hit. Therefore, by the definition of single-track 
propensities P1 and P2, both those dispositions would be triggered. Each disposi-
tion would produce its manifestation—the localization event—only probabilistically. 
But, notice that the structure of those propensities would entail an unwelcomed 
result. In fact, a total of four combinations of outcomes are consistent with the nature 
of P1 and P2 so defined: in two of those occasions, only one of the two localization 
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event takes place, but there would be also one situation where no localization is pro-
duced and one another where two localization events are displayed. But, of course, 
the last two situations are forbidden by the theory. In other words, this model fails to 
account for the mutual exclusivity of the two localization events.
I pass now to the second consideration that I want to point out concerning 
Frigg and Hoefer’s proposal. Looking at the formalism of the theory, the localiza-
tion process postulated by GRW is governed by a single stochastic equation and 
is instantaneous and spontaneous. Because of this, it seems odd to say that the 
dynamics of GRW concerns two distinct coupled dispositions, one of which pro-
vides the triggering conditions for the other. The reason is the following.
Let’s assume that the manifestation of a disposition corresponds to a physical 
event. Then, according to the two-propensities model, we would have a first pro-
cess—grounded by a spontaneous single-track propensity—whose manifestation is 
the hit. The hit, therefore, would be a physical event, and it would trigger the acti-
vation of a disposition to localize (let’s set aside here the problem of mutual exclu-
sivity). Thus, the manifestation of the second disposition would correspond to the 
physical event which we actually measure, i.e. the localization of the system in a 
single region. Given this description, two puzzling aspects arise.
Firstly, it should be pointed out that the hit is not a physical event at all. The hit 
simply represent mathematically the fact that the wave function collapse. However, 
it would not make much sense to say that this description corresponds to a physical 
event, since it would mean that there is a collapse but nowhere in spacetime, given 
that—by definition—the actual localization is produced by the second disposition. 
In addition, we also have no reason to claim that only the manifestation which has 
physical meaning is the one of the second disposition, since that would commit one 
to say that two radically different kinds of dispositions are at play here, such that the 
nature of their manifestations is different. Secondly, and relatedly, this model seems 
to suggest that there is a temporal succession between the hit and the localization. 
However, this is not what GRW postulates. The process of localization is, on the 
contrary, instantaneous. The most natural interpretation would be therefore that the 
disposition underlying this process is a single propensity which has as its unique 
manifestation a spatially-localized event.
Admittedly, the strength of this objection depends on one’s view about dis-
positions. However, I believe that here I have at least made the case for believing 
that—all things being equal—we should prefer a propensity account of GRW which 
grounds the dynamics on the theory on one single disposition only, in place of a 
two-propensity model.
Let’s consider now Suárez’s [34] proposal. Similarly to Frigg and Hoefer, he has 
sketched a possible interpretation of the probabilities within GRW in terms of prob-
abilistic dispositions. He claims that:
The localization process [of GRW] is at the very least compatible with the 
assumption that each quantum particle has an irreducible disposition to local-
ize in an area given by d with frequency f. […] The dispositions that according 
to GRW each particle has to spontaneously reduce upon a region x of area d 
are propensities. (Suárez [34], p. 433)
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Here the author is explicitly using the term ‘propensities’ to denote what I have 
called ‘single-track propensities’. But he also stresses that the propensities within 
GRW cannot have that exact form, since they are spontaneously triggered. At that 
point, however, Suárez does not propose a revised definition of propensities which 
can account for this feature. Thus, in order to spell out more precisely the account 
he is sketching, I shall take spontaneous single-track propensities as a charitable for-
mulation of the kind of dispositions he is referring to.
Given what he says in the quote aforementioned, it seems natural to interpret his 
account as postulating that in GRW each ‘quantum particle’ possesses a set of spon-
taneous single-track propensities. Each of those propensities is characterized by its 
disposition to localize the particle in a different region of space.23 In other words, 
the particle possesses a propensity for every region in which it can be localized. 
Taking again the superposed state �⟩ of Sect. 3 as our example, in that case the sys-
tem would possess both one propensity to localize in region A and one propensity 
to localize in region B. It is now quite easy to notice that a very similar objection 
to the one which I have raised against Frigg and Hoefer’s account can be proposed 
in this context as well. That is, since here we are talking about two distinct disposi-
tions, nothing in the metaphysical structure of the account forbids the two spontane-
ous propensities to manifest together at the same time. Given that they are—so to 
say—uncorrelated, it is possible for them to spontaneously manifest together. This 
scenario is of course very unlikely, but its mere possibility is sufficient to threaten 
the account. Indeed, just as we have seen concerning Frigg and Hoefer’s account, a 
simultaneous manifestation is forbidden by the physics of GRW, and thus any meta-
physical account of the theory have to rule out this scenario categorically.
To recap, starting from the reasons that I have put forward for rejecting the 
account proposed by Frigg and Hoefer and by Suárez, we can formulate a crucial 
desideratum that any propensity theory of GRW has to satisfy. That is, it should 
secure the mutual exclusivity of the possible localization events—and that exactly 
one of them is produced. Then, a second minor desideratum is arguably to avoid 
postulating a two-propensity model similar to the one envisaged within Frigg and 
Hoefer’s proposal.
I claim that if we adopt an account of GRW probabilities in term of spontaneous 
weighted multi-track propensities we can easily satisfy these desiderata. More pre-
cisely, we can claim that physical systems24 instantiate a single disposition—a spon-
taneous weighted multi-track propensity—which grounds both the random pro-
cesses featured in GRW at once. On the one hand, the ‘spontaneous’ nature of those 
23 Notice that in this case the probability dt takes into account both the probability that a spontaneous 
hit takes place and the probability – given by Born’s rule – that the localization happens in that specific 
region.
24 Like the other authors working on this topic, I remain neutral concerning the exact bearers of the 
dispositions. Within GRWm we can plausibly say that the dispositions are possessed by the primitive 
ontology—i.e. the matter. Within GRWf, on the other hand, the issue is more tricky. However, I want 
to stress that this particular ‘ambiguity’ concerning what physical systems are and what are the bearers 
of the dispositions is not a peculiarity of this account but, rather, it is shared by any of the dispositional 
accounts which I have mentioned before.
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dispositions, which is formally represented by the disposition’s probability to be 
self-triggered during a specific interval of time, grounds the frequency  for the hits 
to occur. On the other hand, those dispositions are probabilistic also because—when 
triggerred—they produce a “random” manifestation from a set of possible manifes-
tations. However, since they are weighted multi-track propensities, by definition that 
outcome will not be completely casual. On the contrary, the very nature of those 
dispositions is to assign a distribution of probabilities over the set of their possible 
outcomes. And this is what grounds the objective probabilities linked to the locali-
zation process—i.e. the Born’s rule predictions. More precisely, the set of mutually 
exclusive manifestations of these propensities is the set of all the possible localiza-
tions events, while the probabilities p
(
Mi
)
 for the localization events are the ones 
assigned by the function Pi(x) =
‖‖‖
|| ix
⟩‖‖‖
2
.
In sum, I claim that this propensity account for GRW fares better than its alterna-
tives. First and foremost, thanks to its appeal to multi-track propensities, it is the 
only one—among the ones discussed—which secures the mutual exclusivity of the 
different localization events, thereby avoiding the objection which I have put for-
ward in this section. I take this to be the most decisive advantage of this view. Sec-
ondly, I claim that—all this being equal—this account should be preferred, since it 
is more simple and ontologically parsimonious than the alternative ones suggested 
above. In fact, it postulates a single multi-track propensity to ground the localization 
process and the probabilities described by GRW. Thus, it is neither committed to the 
existence of whole sets of dispositions (one for each possible manifestation), unlike 
the two accounts which I have assessed, nor to the existence of two distinct kinds of 
dispositions, unlike Frigg and Hoefer’s view. In this sense, the account I proposed 
here is more parsimonious both in the number and in the kinds of the propensities 
that it assumes. Finally, it avoids the second of the two objections that I have moved 
against the account sketched by Frigg and Hoefer. In fact, within my account, the 
collapse and the localization are simultaneously realized by the same manifestation: 
once the spontaneous weighted multi-track propensity is (spontaneously) activated, 
it simply produces the localization of the system as its unique manifestation. As I 
said before, this is not by itself a decise point in favour of this proposal, and one 
could still insist that in practice the two-propensity model by Frigg and Hoefer does 
not differ substantially from my account, in this respect. However, ceteris paribus, I 
believe that a simpler model is to be preferred.
In conclusion, my proposal for a dispositionalist ontology of GRW is the fol-
lowing. Physical systems (in the appropriate conditions) instantiate spontaneous 
weighted multi-track propensities, which grounds the two probabilistic terms  and 
Pi(x) . The fundamental ontology of the world is composed by those dispositions, 
in addition to the primitive ontology of GRW. The primitive ontology is thus gov-
erned by them. Moreover, I side with Dorato and Esfeld [15] and Egg and Esfeld 
[16] concerning their interpretation of the wave function within GRW. Indeed, we 
can say that wave function “is a mathematical symbol essentially referring to such 
propensities”. The main aim of this paper has been to refine their account, by show-
ing how to spell out a complete dispositional interpretation of the wave function in 
GRW which can also ground the objective probabilities postulated by the theory. Of 
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course, in this paper I have not argued in favour of the dispositionalist view per se. 
However, what I want to urge is that, if one wants to endorse a dispositionalist view 
of GRW, this would be the best account available.
7  Conclusion
During the last years, dispositionalism has been a live interpretative option concern-
ing the nature of the wave function within collapse theories, in particular among 
those that have defended a primitive ontology view of GRW. Moreover, the dispo-
sitions postulated by collapse theories can be defined as propensities, that is dis-
positions which display probabilistic manifestations. In this way—it is said—we 
can provide also a dispositional interpretation of the objective probabilities postu-
lated by collapse theories. The problem I stressed in this paper is that, within the 
literature concerning the nature of the wave function, the ability of dispositions to 
ground probabilities is merely mentioned and it is never discussed in depth—as far 
as I know. Frigg and Hoefer [22], while discussing about objective probabilities in 
GRW, present a sketch of a plausible propensity account for GRW. However, they do 
not provide a precise definition of those dispositions—contrary to what it is usually 
required from a metaphysical account of dispositions, which are supposed to entail 
precise counterfactual conditionals about what the bearer of the disposition would 
do in certain conditions. In addition, their intuitions concerning the nature of GRW 
propensities are questionable and the rough account they put forward is problem-
atic, as we can see once we formalize it. On the other hand, Suárez [34] proposes a 
slightly more formal account of those propensities. However, also his view faces a 
decisive challenge.
My first aim in this paper has been to formulate a precise inventory of different 
kinds of propensities, in order to express more precisely the accounts which are pre-
sent in the literature. Then, among those kinds of dispositions, I identified one kind 
of propensity which is particularly suitable to account for the probabilistic features 
of GRW theories.25 Those propensities satisfy our desiderata and—following Dorato 
and Esfeld [15], Esfeld and Gisin [18], Egg and Esfeld [16] and Esfeld et al. [19]—
can be also defined as what the wave function refers to.
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